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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A Non-Judicial Dissent to Amendment of Canon 35
By JOHN BUSH
John Bush: Born Denver, Colo.;
graduated from University of Colo-
rado, 1951, B. S. (Business Finance);
senior at University of Denver
College of Law, Associate Editor
of Dicta.
On December 12, 1955, the Colorado supreme court entered an
order appointing Mr. Justice Moore "referee to consider the Canons
of Professional Ethics and the Canons of Judicial Ethics."' The
purpose was to consider whether the canons should be "continued,
revoked or modified .. " Six days of public hearings, at which all
were invited to attend and present their views, were held. First
considered were matters pertaining to Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. This comment is concerned with the report and
recommendation issued by the referee after the hearings on Canon
35. The Colorado court en banc approved and adopted the referee's
report on February 27, 1956.3
The Canon was first adopted by the American Bar Association
upon the recommendation of the judicial committee on September
30, 1937.1 It was adopted by the Colorado supreme court on July 30,
1953.' The Colorado supreme court supplemented the canon in De-
cember, 1955 with an order which required literal compliance with
the canon." Matters regarding judicial canons and their amendment,
have in the past been considered within the sole discretion of the
courts. The referee concluded his report with a recommended
amendment to Canon 35. In adopting the report, the Colorado
supreme court has adopted the referee's recommendation. As thus
amended the Canon provides:
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity
I Re Canon of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
2 Ibid.
3 Id. at 605, 296 P.2d at 473.
4 37 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 149 (1954).
5 I Cola. Rev. Stat. Ann. 156 (1953).
(; Orders and Judgments (of the Colorado Supreme Court), Bk. 43, P. 480.
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and decorum. Until further order of this Court, if the trial judge
in any court shall believe from the particular circumstances
of a given case, or any portion thereof, that the taking of photo-
graphs in the court room, or the broadcasting by radio or tele-
vision of court proceedings would detract from the dignity
thereof, distract the witness in giving his testimony, degrade
the court, or otherwise materially interfere with the achieve-
ment of a fair trial, it should not be permitted; provided, how-
ever, that no witness or juror in attendance under subpoena
or order of the court shall be photographed or have his testi-
mony broadcast over his expressed objection; and provided
further that under no circumstances shall any court proceed-
ing be photographed or broadcast by any person without first
having obtained permission from the trial judge to do so, and
then only under such regulations as shall be prescribed by him.
7
Mr. Justice Moore's report concludes that two dangers must be
avoided. The first is that under the guise of preserving the dignity
and decorum of the court a civil liberty, freedom of the press, might
be invaded or nullified. The second is that under the guise of pro-
tecting the same civil liberty, freedom of the press, individuals
might detract from the court's dignity, distract witnesses, degrade
the court, or create misconceptions in the public mind."
Canon 35 in its original form assumed that court room radio and
television broadcasting and photography interfere with the ad-
ministration of justice. Tests conducted before the referee convinced
him that this assumption is no longer justified. Under the new
Colorado canon, the trial judge must decide under the facts and
circumstances of the particular case whether all or any part of the
proceedings should be withdrawn from complete press and air
coverage in order to insure proper administration of justice in that
case. Essentially, therefore, the report concludes that Canon 35 in
its original form constitutes a prior restraint on the freedom of the
press which is arbitrary and discriminatory and does not bear a fair
relationship to the public welfare.
The report indicates that the question of whether or not the
restrictions imposed by the original canon on freedom of the press
are legally justified depends only on whether photography and
broadcasting will detract from the dignity and decorum of the court,
distract the witnesses, degrade the court or create misconceptions
in the minds of the public. In this context, there seems to be no
doubt that the conclusion of the report is correct. It is submitted
that the conflict can be more properly stated as a conflict between
two civil liberties and not as stated in the report. The real conflict
is between the right of a litigant to a fair trial and the freedom of
the press. The rights of parties to actions, particularly the rights of
defendants in criminal proceedings, were not directly considered
during the hearing, nor is there any statement in the report to
indicate that the referee gave any weight to these rights. He did,
however, acknowledge the possible danger to the right of fair trial.
7 See note I supra at 603, .296 P.2d at 472.
s Id. at 594, 296 P.2d at 468.
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The hearing lasted six days. During that time, with the possible
exception of about twenty minutes, representatives of the mass
communication industry testified, performed demonstrations and
argued their side of the case. The defendant in the criminal case
of the future was not present nor was his case argued. The repre-
sentatives of the industry clearly proved that photography, broad-
casting and televising, if properly done, will not cause physical in-
terference in a trial proceeding. However, this fact is important only
if the court correctly stated the main conflict at issue.
The report states that if relaxation of the original canon causes
detraction of court room dignity and decorum, the canon should be
retained in its present form. Dignity, however, is not a substantive
right possessed by the judicial system. It is but a means of creating
the proper atmosphere to make possible a proceeding which will
insure the defendant a fair and impartial trial. Dignity, in and of
itself, is not the end sought and therefore, is not the -paramount
issue involved. Furthermore, the report states, the previously pro-
hibited activities will not be allowed in a case where they distract
witnesses while giving testimony. At the hearing, the questions
propounded by the refree and the testimony of representatives of
the mass communication industries dealt with the possible distrac-
tion of witnesses in only two ways. The first was whether or not
the broadcasting or photography would cause any physical inter-
ference with the giving of testimony. The second was whether or
not the witness' knowledge that his testimony was being broadcast
would render him so nervous or self-conscious as to decrease his
ability to testify understandably.
The next danger considered, the possibility that broad court-
room publicity might create misconceptions in the minds of the
people, was dealt with by considering whether or not such publicity
would serve to educate the public in the workings of the judicial
system. The above dangers might affect a defendant's rights, but at
most, indirectly. The rights that a defendant is most concerned
about were not presented or argued. These must be considered and
weighed against the opposing considerations before one can be
confident that the step taken is in the right direction.
Considering the rights of a defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing, the Colorado Constitution provides that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."'
This section guarantees a defendant a fair and impartial trial as
does the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. 10 A fair and impartial trial demands that the defendant have
an opportunity to be heard." Inseparable from the right to be heard
is the right to present witnesses. To the extent that the testimony
of his witnesses is made less effective by outside influences, the
defendant's right to be heard is undermined. The report concluded
that since there is no physical distraction the right to present the
uninhibited testimony of witnesses remains unabridged.
9 Colo. Const., art. II. § 25 (1876).
10 Wharton v. People, 104 Colo. 260, 90 P.2d 615 (1939); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1954);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947).
,I In re Oliver, supra note 10.
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It was further concluded that the knowledge of a witness that
his testimony is being broadcast or televised will not adversely
affect his ability to testify. The conclusion was based upon testi-
mony of highly respected commentators and news men. But it was
testimony only of their opinions as laymen which are of limited
value in the field of judicial administration. Moreover, it must be
noted that they were interested witnesses. Assuming, however, that
the conclusion is correct, there are other questions that need
answering. Prior to any criminal trial the prosecutor's case will
have been fully presented to the public because of the publicity
given the preliminary hearing. Public sentiment, usually against
an accused person, will have been crystallized. Will not a witness'
recollection of the facts in favor of the defendant be colored by the
publicity and public sentiment? Again, even if a witness' recollec-
tion is unaffected, will not the fact that his testimony is broadcast
make him reluctant to fully state the facts in favor of the defendant,
in the face of adverse public sentiment? The amended canon re-
serves to a subpoenaed witness the right to prevent broadcast of
his testimony by objecting, but he must take the initiative by ob-
jecting. The question remains whether, as a practical matter any
witness will feel entirely free to object in the atmosphere created
by advance publicity.
Due process requires that a defendant's right to a presumption
of innocence not be abridged. 2 The Colorado Constitution guaran-
tees a right to an impartial jury. ' What affect will the broadcast
of preliminary hearings in a criminal case have on the prospective
juror's ability to make an impartial decision? " What effect will it
have on the defendant's right to be presumed innocent? Another
problem is whether the resultant public sentiment will have ad-
verse affect on these rights during the trial.
Many responsible jurists, lawyers, and journalists believe that
court proceedings can be, and frequently are, materially influenced
under the prevailing system of allowing daily comment on the
court proceedings. 15 Their arguments would apply more forcibly
against fragmentary, editorialized presentation of the actual pro-
ceedings by means of radio and television broadcasting. The un-
derlying principle behind this viewpoint is well stated as follows:
"Proceedings for the determination of guilt or innocence in open
court before a jury are not in competition with any other means
for establishing the charge."'1
After the newsworthy facts of a criminal case have been pre-
sented to the public through radio and television, there is no doubt
12 Eddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488. 174 P.2d 717 (1946).
13Colo. Const., art. II, § 16 (1876).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78-5-3 (1953) sets out the test for jury bias. There is serious ques-
tion whether the test is adeauate for the present circumstances. It was applied at least as early
as 1874. Jones v. People, 2 Colo. 351 (1874).
15 E.g., Shepard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1950) (although reversed on other grounds the court
declared that the press interference constituted sufficient grounds for reversal); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 350 (1945) (concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter discussing dangers of trial by
newspaper. See also, Phillips & McCoy, Conduct of Judges and Lawyers 187 (1952); Perry, The Courts,
the Press and the Public, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 228 (1931).
16 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950).
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that the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence has been
wiped away in the public eye and he has been done irreparable
harm even though the jury may find him not guilty. This argu-
ment can be met by the argument that operation of the presumption
of innocence is limited to the court room, and it has no force in
the arena of public opinion. Undoubtedly, innocent persons have
been and will be subjected to the rigors of criminal proceedings. At
best it can be said that these unfortunate occurences are necessary
evils, but it is not necessary to compound the damage by televising
and broadcasting their trials.
The report's contention that all that transpires at a trial is
public property, and therefore the public has a right to know
everything concerning the trial, is supported by a quotation to
that effect from the United States Supreme Court in the Craig
case.1 7 It is unfortunate but several such broad and general state-
ments can be found. The constitutional provision is that "the
accused shall have the right to a speedy public trial . . ."', There
is no mention of a right guaranteed to the public. This provision
was intended to afford a right only to the accused, a right which
would guarantee him a fair and impartial trial.'"
The legitimate public interest in a trial is twofold .20  First, in
17 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1946) "A trial is a public event. What transpires in
the court is public property."
18 Colo. Const., art. II, § 16 (1876).
1:9 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1945) (concurring
opinian); Kirstowski v. Superior Court, _ Cal. App. _, 300 P. 2d 163, Calif. 3d Dist. Ct. of App.
(1956); I Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 647 (8th ed. 1927).
20 Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 19; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950);
Boldt, Should Canon 35 of the Code of Judicial Ethics Be Revised? 16 Fed. R.D. 83 (1954).
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a free society it is imperative that the public be educated in the
methods of judicial administration. Second, the public must be
constantly aware of whether or not the courts are fully protecting
the liberties guaranteed to the people. The details of any particular
case are only incidental to this dual public interest in a trial. No-
where can one find any mandate as to what method must be used
to satisfy the public interest in trial proceedings. Craig and similar
cases should be placed in proper perspective." They were cases
involving contempt proceedings for allegedly improper comments
on trial proceedings. None of them prescribed a mandatory method
of bringing information of trial proceedings to the public. Each was
only a factual determination that the particular defendant's action
did not present a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice. They reaffirmed the idea that a court has the inherent
power to suppress any serious and imminent threat to the admin-
istration of justice. The factual determination in the above cases
was strongly criticized by Justice Jackson as follows: "This court
has gone a long way to disable a trial judge from dealing with
press interference with the trial process. ' 22 Even more important
is the fact that the cases were all tried to judges sitting without
juries. This fact has been suggested as a reason for the broad state-
ment of the public's right.
2 3
The referee's report states "here then is a case involving a
conflict between liberty and authority, a conflict that is sometimes
labeled 'civil right v. the police power' or 'liberty of the individual
v. the general welfare.' "24 It is more accurately stated as a con-
flict between freedom of the press and the right to a fair and im-
partial trial. Both freedoms are of equal dignity. "Newspapers in
the enjoyment of their constitutional rights, may not deprive
accused persons of their right to a fair trial. '2 The same rule
should apply to radio and television. In a case where no particular
medium of communication is required to satisfy the legitimate
public interest in a trial and a reasonable means to fulfill that re-
quirement is already provided, weighing the balance in favor of
freedom of the press is not justified. The conclusion of the report
rests heavily on the fact that modern technological advances have
made possible live broadcasting and televising without physical
disturbances. Whether or not there is a physical distraction should
not be the sole test. To assure that the step taken does not abridge
the right of fair trial, this right should be given full consideration.
If it is determnied that there is no abridgment of this right, or any
abridgment is out-weighed by the value of a completely free press,
then that assurance will be possible.
21 Pennekomp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 352 (1941).
22 Shepard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1950).
23 Ibid.
24 Quoting Hamilton v. City of Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 231, 124 P.2d 757, 759 (1942).
22 Shepord v. Florida, 341 U S. 50, 53 (1950).
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